A Grenville Clark Hypothetical by Dunne, Gerald T.
Nova Law Review
Volume 7, Issue 1 1982 Article 14
A Grenville Clark Hypothetical
Gerald T. Dunne∗
∗
Copyright c©1982 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
A Grenville Clark Hypothetical
Gerald T. Dunne
Abstract
In any discussion of Nuclear Weapons, Grenville Clark (1882-
1967) is an important figure. He had a long, happy, and successful life.
Born to wealth, power, and position, his historic achievements included
distinction in two wars-launching the Plattsburg training camps
which were the catalyst of the Preparedness Movement in World War
I, and in World War II virtually single-handedly securing the enactment
of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 which produced
a minimally armed America on the eve of Pearl Harbor.
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In any discussion of Nuclear Weapons, Grenville Clark (1882-
1967) is an important figure. He had a long, happy, and successful life.
Born to wealth, power, and position, his historic achievements included
distinction in two wars-launching the Plattsburg training camps
which were the catalyst of the Preparedness Movement in World War
I, and in World War II virtually single-handedly securing the enact-
ment of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 which pro-
duced a minimally armed America on the eve of Pearl Harbor. Peace-
time attainments must include organization of a critical resistance to
FDR's court-packing plan of 1937 and revitalization of the Federal
Civil Rights Act. Most significant, however, was his response to Secre-
tary Stimson's post-Hiroshima charge to "go home and stop World
War III". Though racked with cancer, Clark gave the last full measure
of devotion in attempting, through proposals for disarmament, world
government, and world law, to forestall terminal nuclear holocaust.
This surely will be his enduring achievement.
Grenville Clark went to his grave in early 1967, believing that his
life and work, notwithstanding intermediate success had been an ulti-
mate failure; his sunset efforts to alarm the human race to the mortal
peril which beset it seemed to have availed nothing; if anything that
peril had only proliferated and magnified during his effort to constrain
it. Nonetheless he had striven mightily, expending personal fortune and
dwindling physical resources in writing, speaking and traveling. A mea-
sure of his concern could be glimpsed in his approach to a public rela-
tions expert (a maneuver unthinkable otherwise) to promote sales of a
landmark book, World Peace Through World Law. The expert, Ed-
ward Bernays, who had seen all manner of men in his time, expressed
an expert probatory judgment: "His personality was most aristocratic,
* Adapted and revised from the forthcoming book, GRENVILLE CLARK: PUBLIC
LIFE, PRIVATE MAN.
** Professor of Law, St. Louis University.
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and his behavior gentle and unassuming. I liked him."1
Nonetheless, the impact of personality could go just so far, and in
the scale of Grenville Clark's grand design, it was not far enough. The
nuclear danger impended and worsened with inertia, the strongest force
in human affairs deployed on the side of confrontation and potential
disaster. Then two things happened.
The Diplomat
On May 19, 1981, George F. Kennan received the Einstein
Award. In any case, an award to Kennan would have merely gilded the
lily; Kennan had already left his mark on his times; his credentials ran
from the first blueprint for Soviet containment, expressed in a famous
"Mr. X" article in Foreign Affairs in 19472 to persona non grata ex-
pulsion from the USSR in 1953. Kennan's laureate response was in a
totally different idiom than his "X" article; it denounced:
the supreme sacrilege of putting an end to the civilization out of
which we have grown, the civilization which made us what we are,
the civilization, without which our children and grandchildren can
have no chance of self-realization, possibly no chance for life
itself.,
Kennan went on to stress "the admonition to neglect nothing - no
effort, no unpleasantness, no controversy, no sacrifice - which could
conceivably help preserve us from committing this fatal folly."' 4 He
then reached the core of his argument against nuclear weaponry:
I question whether these devices are really weapons at all .... To
my mind the nuclear bomb is the most useless weapon ever in-
vented. It can be employed to no rational purpose. It is not even an
effective defense against itself. It is only something with which, in a
moment of petulance or panic, you commit such fearful acts of de-
1. Letter from Edward Bernays to Gerald Dunne (May 19, 1981).
2. Kennan, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 566 (1947).
3. Address by George Kennan, Albert Einstein Peace Prize Foundation (May 19,
1981) (condensed in The Illusion of Security, St. Louis Post Dispatch, May 31, 1981,
at E2, col. 4).
4. Id.
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struction as no sane person would ever wish to have on his
conscience.5
Kennan admitted that his admonitions were not new but rather
restatements of what "wise and far-seeing people" had been asserting
for "over thirty years." He named names, beginning with Albert Ein-
stein and concluding with every president of the United States from
Dwight Eisenhower to Jimmy Carter."
He did not name Grenville Clark, whose book World Peace
Through World Law expressed his thesis in extended and systematic
form. Perhaps the omission was deliberate, for in 1948 (in Clark's view
at least) the laureate was an integral part of the "Truman-Leahy-Mar-
shall-Levett (sic)-Kennan-Harriman combination" whose "fixed ideas"
were frozen into an icy Cold War carapate.7
In a subsequent New Yorker article, 8 Kennan edged close to Clark
in several planes of encounter. One was a plea for a less demonic per-
ception of the Soviet adversary. A second insisted on the quantum dif-
ference separating nuclear arms from conventional ones. The third
could have been vintage Clark, as far as it went:
there are many people who consider it useless, or even undesirable
to try to get rid of these weapons entirely, and that a satisfactory
solution can somehow be found . . . . I believe that until we con-
sent to recognize that the nuclear weapons we hold in our own
hands are as much a danger to us as those that repose in the hands
of our supposed adversaries there will be no escape from the confu-
sions and dilemmas to which such weapons have now brought us
9
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Letter from Grenville Clark to Cord Meyer (Feb. 28, 1948), quoted in J.
Bantell, Perpetual Through World Law 217 (1979) (unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Connecticut).
8. Kennan, Reflection on the Soviet Union, The New Yorker, Nov. 2, 1981, at
54, 62; cf. 6 G. CLARK, A PLAN FOR PEACE 16-18 (1954 condensation).
9. Kennan, supra note 8, at 62.
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The President
In his article Kennan turned to the subject of nuclear weapons
"with a sigh and a sinking of the heart."10 However, before type was
set, Ronald Reagan, in a thoughtless and casual response at a mid-
October 1981 press conference, asserted a belief that a tactical ex-
change of battlefield weapons could occur between NATO and Warsaw
Pact forces "without bringing either one of the major powers to push-
ing the button."11
The President hardly bargained for the reponse he got. The follow-
ing weekend, hundreds of thousands of people, finally comprehending
the possibilities of atomic war involving them, marched in protest
through the streets of London, Paris, Brussels and Rome. Clark had
indeed foreseen the possibility, and remarkably George Kennan, his old
adversary, cited that prophetic vision accepting the Grenville Clark
Prize at Dartmouth College on November 16, 1981:
if the various governments did not find a way to put a stop to this
insanity, the awareness of the indescribable dangers it presented
would some day, as [Clark] put it "penetrate the general masses of
the people in all nations" with the result that these masses would
begin to put increasing and indeed finally irresistable pressure on
their governments to abandon the policies that were creating this
danger.1 2
Kennan called the recent growth of the anti-nuclear war move-
ment the most striking phenomenon of the early 1980s. Within twenty-
four hours his appraisal was vindicated; President Reagan in a hastily
arranged speech at the national Press Club, eschewed all talk of push-
ing buttons, but rather offered the Soviets a reciprocal pull-back of all
tactical nuclear weapons from actual or proposed deployment.
It remained an open question whether the presidential proposal
would be accepted at all, or if accepted would provide merely the con-
tinuation of an uneasy truce or offer an actual threshold to a genuine
peace. Nonetheless, the mere fact of enunciation represented the tri-
10. Id.
11. Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1981, at A1, col. 1.
12. Address by George Kennan, Dartmouth College (Nov. 16, 1981).
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umph of an idea as well as the extension of the moral and intellectual
force of one man-a man dead now fourteen years and born almost a
century earlier-whose life and achievement exemplified the reiterated
assertion of a long time friend that the only certainty of history was
that men would make it.
Men make history far more by ideas than by actions, and Arthur
Selwynn Miller's four incisive constitutional propositions for planetary
survival may be truly seminal. As a lifelong man of law, Grenville
Clark would have been arrested by them.
Indeed to the Miller quadrilateral, Clark could well add three core
propositions of his own. One would be a thesis from the preamble of his
Declaration of the Second Dartmouth Conference on peace, disarma-
ment, and world survival, which, mutatis mutandis, might itself serve
as Miller's lietmotif:
The highest sovereignty on earth resides in the peoples who inhabit
the plant. National sovereignty is justified only as it safeguards the
basic sovereignty of the peoples themselves. Since in a nuclear age,
national sovereignty alone cannot serve its highest obligation, it
must be buttressed.... 13
Second, and especially apposite here would be Clark's talent for
persuasively extrapolating values implicit in the constitutional design to
the necessities of the hour, a process involving a mutational change in
the document itself. Here would stand his landmark Supreme Court
briefs. The first, submitted in Hague v. C1014 was a critical component
of the process which rescued the Federal Civil Rights Act from atrophy
and made the statute a vital force in American life.1 5 The other, in
Minersville School District v. Gobitis,1 6 drew on language, logic, and
history for an eventually dominant constitutional constraint against col-
lective ritualism violative of conscience. Such intrusions were to be sub-
jected to the strictest of judicial scrutiny.
13. Declaration of the Second Dartmouth Conference, Dublin, N.H. (Oct. 5,
1965).
14. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
15. For a discussion of the case see Gibbons, Hague v. CIO: A Retrospect, 52
N.Y.U. L. REv. 738 (1977).
16. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
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In the third place, or perhaps in the first, would be Clark's hard-
bitten realization that notwithstanding formularies and institutional ar-
rangements, public opinion was the dominant force in bringing results
to pass in the domain of policy. More than this, the existing procedures
of the law could well afford the ideal vehicle for placing the Miller
quadrilateral in appropriate posture for adversary scrutiny, public de-
bate, and eventual judicial declaration. More than that, under the
touchstone of declaratory judgment, it can go forward to eventual reso-
lution galvanizing and shaping the sentiment which will in due course
afford it vitality.
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